

TOP SECRET - EYES ONLY

Veto 10/10/72

~~SECRET~~  
**AMERICAN AND SOVIET DIPLOMATIC  
ACTION TO REINFORCE THE QUARANTINE  
OF IL-28s.**

1. A strong private message to Khrushchev re: stipulating our position on understanding, including indication that quarantine and surveillance would be continued.
2. Simultaneously with the foregoing message, diplomatic groundwork would be undertaken with the CAC and NAM countries, as well as other key UN countries, for further action in those bodies. We would seek support from:
  - a. Immediate bilateral representations to Havana by those countries still maintaining relations to the effect that maintenance of the bombers in Cuba and continued refusal by Cuba to agree to verification and long-term safeguards would be the occasion for the breaking off of diplomatic and economic relations.
  - b. Within forty-eight hours an UN resolution, censuring the ineffectiveness of the Soviet and Cuban performance under the Kennedy-Khrushchev understanding and calling for continued close naval surveillance and tightening of the quarantine. The USSR would veto its motion, together with a formal complaint, to the UN Security Council.
- c. Immediately following the UN resolution, notes in the UN designed to dramatize the ineffectiveness of Soviet and Cuban compliance with the Kennedy-Khrushchev understanding, and designed to reinforce

*Exhibit**Classification: CONFIDENTIAL**Cat. B - Transcribed by [unclear]**with notes, [unclear] controlled by [unclear]**Cat. C - Caption and notes retained by [unclear]**Reviewed by [unclear]**Date: 5/23/88***DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/AMR****REVIEWED BY [unclear] DATE 6/16/88****( ) RELEASE ( ) CLASSIFY****( ) EXCISE ( ) DECLASSIFY IN PART****( ) DENY ( ) Non-Responsive****FOIA or PA exemptions****To authority to****( ) CLASSIFY as [unclear], OADR****( ) DOWNGRADE TS to ( ) S or ( ) C, OADR****87 - 0082114**

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UN exhortation to Cuba to cooperate with the UN. This would involve bringing to the surface as much as possible the efforts of U Thant and others.

3. At the same action is sought in the CIS, that is, approximately forty-eight hours after the private message to Khrushchev, a public statement by the President briefly reviewing the history of the Cuban affair, summarizing our interpretation of the Kennedy-Khrushchev understanding, pointing up portions of the understanding which had not been carried out, reiterating the intent of the U. S. Government that the basic conditions of the original understanding be fulfilled, and setting forth the action being sought in the CIS and the UN.

4. Immediately following favorable CAS action, begin a gradual tightening of enforcement of the quarantine, to be carried through the following phases over a ten-day period: initially, applying the interception and halting, as well as boarding procedures first to Free World non-Soviet charter ships, next to Free World ships in charter to the Soviet, then to bloc ships, and finally to Soviet ships. Subsequently, consideration could be given to adding PCL to the contraband list.

5. Air surveillance would be continued during this period at whatever level required for strictly intelligence purposes, with any position dealt with under the procedures set forth in Mr. Nitze's memorandum.

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G:JNJohnson:ges 11/10/62